Volume 90, Number 4 · October 2026
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Articles
This article examines General George Washington’s attempts to manage and combat the smallpox crisis prior to ordering the first mass health inoculation mandate in U.S. history during the American Revolutionary War. The paper argues that Washington’s efforts to promote and enforce an inoculation mandate demonstrated his adaptability as a military leader to overcome one of the largest crises of the war. The general’s direct support of army doctors’ mass inoculation measures assured the success of one of the most secretive and lesser-known military operations of the war, and contributed to the preservation of the army. The gradual inoculation of the Continental Army also demonstrates the importance of flexible leadership to overcome prior failures in wartime and contributed to increasing the acceptance of mass vaccinations following the war within North America.
Historians have neglected the military writings of H. G. Wells. His views on the rational exploitation of emerging military technologies compare favorably with better-known accounts produced during the first half of the twentieth century. His strategic prescriptions for war with Nazi Germany were, however, politically naïve, and the criticism they provoked contributed to the decline of his reputation as a public intellectual. Thereafter his work on military matters, and much else besides, fell into obscurity.
This article analyzes military violence by German volunteer units in Latvia and the Province of Poznan in 1918–1919. Drawing on archival sources and contemporary accounts, it examines how tactical, disciplinary, and situational factors shaped patterns of violence. In Latvia, improvised formations, poor supply, and young leadership produced flexible yet brutal warfare, while Allied observers and local populations influenced the limits of force. The Poznan uprising resulted in distinctive forms of coercion and reprisal. German violence varied with strategic aims, local conditions, and shifting volunteer motivations. The findings contribute to debates on paramilitary violence, state formation, and military cultures in post-1918 Central and Eastern Europe.
Tactical Subculture as Combat Multiplier: The 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment in Sicily, 1943
896–921This article examines the emergence and impact of a distinctive tactical subculture within the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment during Operation Husky, the Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943. By analyzing the unit’s training, operational performance, and after-action assessments through the lens of organizational culture theory, I demonstrate how American airborne forces developed a unique cultural framework that enabled small, isolated groups of paratroopers to maintain combat effectiveness despite widespread dispersion. The regiment’s performance in Sicily shaped subsequent airborne operations throughout World War II. This cultural analysis offers new insights into how tactical subcultures function as combat multipliers, challenging conventional assessments that have characterized the airborne’s contribution to Operation Husky as ineffective or marginal.
While studies of combat motivation once suggested that soldiers principally fought for their comrades, historians now argue that strong interpersonal bonds could not have survived the attrition of the two world wars. Research based on Second World War service records suggests otherwise, however. This article furthers this incipient revisionism by investigating how the composition of a Canadian wartime unit, the Seaforth Highlanders, changed across the war based on the battalion nominal roll and digitized service records. It argues that historians have fundamentally misunderstood the impact of casualties, as the continuity needed for unit cohesion to motivate soldiers did, in fact, persist. This article demonstrates that scholars must reassess the supposed inability of social groups to survive the modern battlefield.
Most histories of the Iraq War treat the 2007–2008 Surge as the turning point of the conflict. During this campaign, the U.S.-led coalition under the leadership of General David H. Petraeus pursued a so-called counterinsurgency strategy; it thus restored security to Iraq and defeated the insurgency that had been destabilizing the country since 2003. The release of new records, however, reveals that U.S. and Iraqi operations carried out throughout 2006 were as critical to the outcome of the war as the surge. These records also demonstrate that observers and historians have inflated Petraeus’s role in the defeat of the Iraq insurgency at the expense of General George Casey Jr.
