Abstract
Most histories of the Iraq War treat the 2007–2008 Surge as the turning point of the conflict. During this campaign, the U.S.-led coalition under the leadership of General David H. Petraeus pursued a so-called counterinsurgency strategy; it thus restored security to Iraq and defeated the insurgency that had been destabilizing the country since 2003. The release of new records, however, reveals that U.S. and Iraqi operations carried out throughout 2006 were as critical to the outcome of the war as the surge. These records also demonstrate that observers and historians have inflated Petraeus’s role in the defeat of the Iraq insurgency at the expense of General George Casey Jr.
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Cite this article
Nicholas J. Schlosser, “2006: The Turning Point of the Iraq War,” The Journal of Military History 90, no. 4 (October 2026): 953–975.
